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Abstract
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many of the answers to business ethics quandaries lie. Further, we think that answering such questions
requires the use of a yet deeper, and universal "contract" superseding even individual ones. The theory
that combines both these deeper and thinner kinds of contracts we label “Integrative Social Contracts
Theory,” or "ISCT" for short.
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Précis for Ties that Bind*
Thomas Donaldson
Thomas W. Dunfee
We wrote the book, Ties that Bind, out of our conviction that answering today’s
questions require a new approach to business ethics, an approach that exposes the implicit
understandings or "contracts" that bind industries, companies, and economic systems into
moral communities. It is in these economic communities, and in the often unspoken
understandings that provide their ethical glue, that we believe many of the answers to
business ethics quandaries lie. Further, we think that answering such questions requires
the use of a yet deeper, and universal "contract" superseding even individual ones. The
theory that combines both these deeper and thinner kinds of contracts we label
“Integrative Social Contracts Theory,” or "ISCT" for short.
ISCT does not overturn popular wisdom. While it asserts that the social contracts
that arise from specific cultural and geographic contexts have legitimacy, it
acknowledges a limit to that legitimacy. It recognizes the moral authority of key
transcultural truths, for example, the idea that human beings everywhere are deserving of
respect. The social contract approach we detail holds that any social contract terms
existing outside these boundaries must be deemed illegitimate, no matter how completely
subscribed to within a given economic community. In this sense, all particular or "micro"
social contracts, whether they exist at the national, industry, or corporate level, must
conform to a hypothetical "macro" social contract that lays down moral boundaries for
any social contracting. ISCT thus lies midway on the spectrum of moral belief separating
*
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relativism from absolutism. It allows substantial “moral free space” for nations and other
economic communities to shape their distinctive concepts of economic fairness, but it
draws the line at flagrant neglect of core human values.
Our approach takes “moral free space” seriously. It insists that morality can be
"conditional" or "situational" at least in the sense that two conflicting conceptions of
ethics can sometimes both be valid, and that community agreements about ethics often
matter. Two economic systems need not have precisely the same view about the ethics of
insider trading. Their views about what is wrong with insider trading may differ, yet both
may be legitimate. Nor does every corporation have to follow exactly the same
conception of fairness as it designs flextime or seniority rules. It follows from our view
that all economic actors must recognize the critical role of social contracts in the
communities they impact. To fail to do so, as many companies have done in the past, is
to display moral blindness.
On our view, as social contracts change, so too do the challenges for business.
The ethical “game” of business today is played by different rules, and harbors different
penalties and benefits, than it did decades ago. Broad shifts of moral consensus have
occurred. In subtle, far reaching shifts, managers and members of the general public have
gradually redefined their view of the underlying responsibilities of large corporations.
Half a century ago, companies were basically expected to focus on producing goods and
services at reasonable prices; today, corporations are held responsible for a variety of
issues involving fairness and quality of life. In companies throughout the world, gender
issues, racial issues, and questions of the clash between work and family, are included in
the agenda of corporate management.
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The challenge that we accepted in TIES was to find a theory that accepts basic
moral precepts, such as "Don't lie," "Be fair," and "Respect the environment," even as it
refuses to pretend that these broad-brushed concepts provide full moral clarity. The
challenge was to articulate an approach that holds fundamental truths to be relevant even
as it accounts for legitimate differences in business communities and historical periods.
We believe that ISCT is such a theory.
The concepts that inform ISCT are at the same time simple and complex. The
simple idea, as stated already, is that implicit agreements constitute part of the basic
software of business ethics. Without these “social contracts” knowing what matters and
what doesn’t ethically in a specific context is impossible. This very simple idea,
however, needs explication and justification. Hence, ISCT is fitted with a more complex
rationale and set of concepts.
In the extensive description of ISCT that we undertake in TIES, we begin with the
same kind of thought experiment that was used to justify the traditional social contract
arguments of Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Rawls. We utilize the approach of the
classic contractarian thinkers such as Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Rawls, but we add
an important point. They asked about what citizens would require of the government and
how they would define political justice. We, on the other hand, inquire about what
economic participants would agree upon as defining business ethics. In the traditional
manner, we begin with a thought experiment that envisions the terms of a contract for the
foundation for economic ethics that would be acceptable to a diverse set of imaginary
contractors (some greed driven egoists, some deeply religious altruists, most probably inbetween) representing the varied attitudes of the modern world. We assume that these
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contractors are rational, i.e., not afflicted by inconsistency or logical confusion, and that
they are knowledgeable, i.e., they know the range of facts accepted at the time as being
true. We assume not, as Rawls does (Rawls, 1971), that these hypothetical contractors
are ignorant of all facts concerning themselves. They may or may not know that they are
Christian, Moslem, of a risk-adverse or risk-prone personality, etc. We assume only in
this regard that they do not know in what economic communities they are members. For
example, they do not know that they work for XYZ corporation, participate in country
N’s economic system, that they pay dues in worker union K, or ply their trade in
profession P or industry Q. These facts about their economic membership are hidden to
them. In a similar way, their level of personal wealth is obscured from them. They are
ignorant of whether they possess a massive fortune, or nothing at all. Hence, one might
envision all of rational humanity capable of voluntary choice, afflicted with the partial
amnesia just described, gathering for a global congress to construct an agreement that
would provide a fundamental framework for ethical behavior in economic activities.
We do not assume, as again Rawls would assume, that the contractors are ignorant
of their economic and political preferences. An individual may know her preferences,
that she prefers to be rich rather than poor, wine to beer, employment in a worker-owned
rather over employment in an investor-owned firm, a Libertarian to a Socialist form of
government. The question then becomes what terms, if any, would be acceptable to these
contractors?
We assume that the contractors do not come to the table entirely bereft of moral
principles. They at least bring with them the underlying senses of right and wrong with
which they have grown up. They bring with them these settled understandings of deep
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moral values. Because the contractors are unaware of other economic preferences and
memberships, they lack detailed knowledge of their economic morality. Yet even as they
lack such detailed knowledge, they know the basic values to which they subscribe. Some
may profess philosophical utilitarianism. Some may profess philosophical Kantianism.
Others may adhere to ethical principles articulated in their preferred religion (in Judaism
or Christianity this might be the Ten Commandments; in Buddhism it might be the
principles of the "Dhamapada" ). And some may subscribe to the traditional principles
that have been handed down to them historically through their family, their village, or
their culture.
When these hypothetical yet rational global contractors confront the fact that it
would be impossible to obtain an intellectual consensus concerning adoption of a single
morality as the framework for global economic ethics, then how would they go about
resolving their dilemma of finding a basis for agreement? We believe that they would
nonetheless be motivated to find such a basis. First, we assume that many are driven by
an innate moral sense which will lead them to seek and to recognize elements of a
foundational morality. That is, most humans are "hardwired" to be ethical. Second, our
focus is on economic ethics. In this domain there are special considerations that must be
of concern to rational, knowledgeable contractors. For example, rational contractors
would realize the vital importance of having a framework of morality as a foundation for
economic interaction. Without a core common morality, the result would be the
economic analogue to a Hobbesian state of nature. Economic life would be, using
Hobbes's language, "nasty and brutish," if not also "short." Such chaotic economic
conditions have prevailed from time to time in nations that lacked the social and political
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background institutions necessary to sustain an ethical framework. In such a state,
promises are not kept. Property is not respected. Violence is used to obtain economic
advantage. Capital markets either become distorted, or fail altogether owing to a
fundamental lack of trust.
Finally, we believe that rational contractors would rely upon a limited set of core
assumptions in framing their search for a common economic ethics, where "economic
ethics” refers to the principles establishing the boundaries of proper behavior in the
context of the production and exchange of goods and services.
These are as follows:
•

All humans are constrained by bounded moral rationality. This means that
even rational persons knowledgeable about ethical theory cannot always
divine good answers to moral problems without being acquainted with
community-specific norms.

•

The nature of ethical behavior in economic systems and communities
helps determine the quality and efficiency of economic interactions.
Higher quality and more efficient economic interactions are preferable to
lower quality and less efficient economic interactions.

•

All other things being equal, economic activity that is consistent with the
cultural, philosophical, or religious at attitudes of economic actors is
preferable to economic activity that is not.

In virtue of these three propositions (above), individual contractors would desire
the option to join and to exit economic communities as a means of leveraging their ability
to achieve the benefits of either greater efficiency or greater compatibility with preferred
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religious, philosophical, or community norms.
The hypothetical members of the global economic community would be
capable of considering which norms would be best to guide all business activity in a way
that achieves fairness. In this hypothetical state of nature, we argue that such rational
global contractors would agree to the following de minimis macrosocial contract setting
the terms for economic ethics:

1. Local economic communities have moral free space in which they may
generate ethical norms for their members through microsocial contracts.
2. Norm-generating microsocial contracts must be grounded in consent,
buttressed by the rights of individual members to voice and exit.
3. In order to become obligatory (legitimate), a microsocial contract norm must
be compatible with hypernorms.
4. In cases of conflicts among norms satisfying macrosocial contract terms 1-3,
priority rules or “rules of thumb” must be established through the application of
rules consistent with the spirit and letter of the macrosocial contract. 1

1

ISCT priority principles (also sometimes referred to as “rules of thumb”) are:
A. Local community norms have priority unless adopting them harms members of another
community.
B. Local community norms designed to resolve norm conflicts have priority unless adopting them
harms members of another community
C. The more global the source of the norm, the greater the norm’s priority.
D. Norms essential to the maintenance of the economic environment in which the transaction occurs
have priority over norms potentially damaging to that environment.
E. Patterns of consistency among alternative norms add weight for priority.
F. Priority is given to well-defined norms over less well-defined ones.
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We use certain core definitions throughout the book as we discuss the
implications of the ISCT macrosocial contract. “Hypernorms” are principles so
fundamental that they constitute norms by which all others are to be judged. Hypernorms
are discernible in a convergence of religious, political and philosophical thought. An
"authentic norm" is one that is generated within a community's moral free space and
which satisfies the requirements of terms 1 and 2 of the macrosocial contract. Authentic
norms are based upon the attitudes and behaviors of the members of their source
communities. A "legitimate norm" is an authentic norm that is compatible with
hypernorms. A norm has to be established as legitimate before it may become binding
for members of the norm-generating community.
TIES details these core concepts and suggests ways in which they can be applied
to business decisions. For example, we describe at some length an example of a
structural hypernorm that we call the “hypernorm of necessary social efficiency,” or
“efficiency hypernorm” for short. This hypernorm identifies duties to maintain the
efficiency of societal systems, including economic institutions, designed to promote
economic welfare and social justice. A norm, policy, or institution satisfies the efficiency
hypernorm when it contributes to the efficiency of the provision of necessary social
goods, that is, aggregate economic welfare or social justice. The hypernorm entails,
among other things, that economic actors have duties to support efficient policies and
institutions that promote liberty and due process, as well as minimal possibilities for
health, food, housing, and education.
TIES emphasizes the role of communities as the source of authentic norms. The
familiar concept of the corporate “stakeholder” is often useful in identifying relevant
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ISCT communities. Stakeholders of corporations usually also constitute ISCT
communities. In the book we offer many proxies and presumptions for use in identifying
relevant communities, authentic norms, and hypernorms. The type of evidence required
for such identifications will often be commonly known and readily available.
In TIES we illustrate the application of ISCT to specific issues. For example, we
discuss at length how ISCT can be used to unravel the phenomenon of bribery around the
world. ISCT reveals that bribery is typically condemned by high priority authentic norms
and that most forms of bribery also violate hypernorms.
Thus, we offer ISCT as a means to highlight the ethical relevance of existing
norms in industries, corporations, and other economic communities, even as it also must
limit the acceptable range of such norms. Our aim is to reach beyond the generality of,
say, Kantian Deontology or "virtue" ethics to allow a more detailed normative
assessment of particular ethical problems in business.” It is a theory that accommodates
the widely-held intuition that different ethical precepts are sometimes appropriate for
different industries, companies and professions. The ethics of professional doctors need
not be precisely the same as the ethics of journalists. Nor do the gift and entertainment
practices within a Japanese keiretsu need to conform to the practices for government
contracting within the United States. In accommodating diversity, ISCT recognizes
variety in individual and cultural values and preferences. Thus, it refuses to impose a
broad conception of the "Good" upon dissenters, even as it recognizes the relevance of
transcultural moral understanding.
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In sum, then, the same logic that sanctifies a handshake between two individuals
turns out also to sanctify the implicit understandings of economic communities woven
throughout the business world. These are the informal but critical agreements—or
"social contracts" —that provide the warp and woof of economic life. These are the
agreements that exist within industries, national economies, trade groups, and
corporations, and, further, that are the implicit “contracts” critical for understanding
business ethics. These, then, are the “ties that bind.”
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